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Appellant.
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and defendant, in taking his appeal from such adjudication,
improperly designates objectionable ruling as "order revoking
probation" rather than judgment of which order was an
intt>gral part, and where attempted appPal was
taken
and respondent suffered no prejudice by reason of improper
de~ignation, notice of appeal should be construed as sufficient
to eonstitute an appeal from the "judg·mcnt," as authorized
and intended, and merits of appeal will be considered in interest of justice.
[5) Id.-Probation--Review.-.Judgment pronounced against deff'ndant on revocation of his probation will not be disturbed
on appeal where, at time of such revocation, a hearing was
had wherein it appeared that defendant had been found guilty
of conspiracy to violate bookmaking statute (Pen. Code,
~ 337a), and that judgment of convietion, though not then
final pending appeal, was sufficient to warrant trial court's
conclusion that defPndant was engaged in criminal practices
in violation of terms of his probation.

APPEAIJ from a judgment of the Superior Court of IJos
Angeles County. F'red Miller, ,Judge. Affirmed.
Conviction of bookmaking. Notice of appeal from order
revoking probation construed as noti(:e of appeal from judgment.
Andrew H. McConnell, Samuelson & Buck and Clarence
Hengel for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and ·william E.
James, Deputy Attorney General, for Hesponclent.
SPENCE, J.-In September, 1951, defeudant pleaded guilty
to a charge of violating Penal Code, section 337 a, subdivision
~l (bookmaking), and applied for probation. On November 5,
] 9GJ, upon arraignment for judgment, procee<lings \\·ere suspended and defendant was placed on ''probation for a period
of two years under the following conditions: Defendant must
serve thirty tlays of his probationary period in the County
.JaiL with good time a llmvec1, if earned; must not engage in
gambling activities; and must obey all rules and regulations
of the Probation Department.'' On Ma~· 7, 1953. the court
found that drfendant had violatetl the terms of his probation,
which was I hereupon revoked. and jnc!gment \Yas pronotmced,
whereby defendant was sentenced to the eouuty jail for the
term of three months. Defendant appeals from the "order
revokillg probation.''
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[43 C.2d 143; 271 P.2d 872]

Preliminarily, the propriety of defendant's designation of
his appeal as an appeal from the "order" rather than the
"judgment" must be considered. At the time probation
was granted in November, 1951, as well as later when it was
revoked and sentence was pronounced, Penal Code, section
1237, as amended in 1951, authorized an appeal by a defendant : '' 1. Prom a final judgment of convictiou; an order
gmnting probation shall be deemed to be a final .iuclgrnent
within the meam:ng of this sect·ion; 2. . . . 3. Prom any order
made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the
party." (Emphasis added.) Prior to the 1951 amendment
adding the italicized clause, an order granting probation did
not constitute a "final judgment of conviction" from which
an appeal might be taken. (In re Phillips, 17 Cal.2d 55,
63-64 [109 P.2d 344, 132 A.L.R. 644]; People v. Leach, 90
Cal.App.2d 667, 671 [203 P.2d 544].) [1] While under
the 1951 amendment an order g-ranting probation is expressly
designated a "final judgment" for the purpose of appeal
(People v. Haeussler, 41 Cal.2d 252, 254 [260 P.2d 8] ; People
v. Brown, 114 Cal.App.2c1 52, 53 [249 P .2d 595] ; People v.
Smnner, 117 Cal.App.2d 40 [254 P.2d 598) ), a subsequent
order revoking probation does not thereby become an "order
made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the
party" and so appealable. (Pen. Code, § 1237, subd. 3.) To
hold otherwise would give the 1951 amendment greater scope
than its language would reasonably support in its limited
extension of a defendant's right to appeal from a theretofore
nonappealable order. (3 Cal.Jur.2d, § 86, p. 536.) Rather,
it would appear that upon entry of judgment in a case
following the order revoking probation, the latter order does
not gain any added stature by reason of the 1951 amendment
because made after the order granting probation but it remains, as before, an intermediate order reviewable on appeal
from the judgment. (People v. Boyce, 99 Cal.App.2d 439,
442 [221 P.2d 1011].) [2] Of course, an order revoking
probation made after entry of judgment is appealable within
the express terms of subdivision 3, section 1237, of the Penal
Code. (People v. Martin, 58 Cal.App.2d 677, 678 [137 P.2d
468].)
[3] However, a notice of appeal will be liberally construed
to permit a hearing on the merits and avoid a dismissal beeause of some technical defect or irregularity. (People v.
Guerrero, 22 Cal.2d 183, 185 [137 P.2d 21]; Rules on Appeal,
rule 31, 36 Cal.2d 26.) [4] Here the judgment, after pre-
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order was an rntt>O'le<l
the attempted
taken
same day that the
was pronounced) and respondent
has suffered no
reason of the improper
tion, the notice of appeal should be construed as sufficient
to constitute an appeal from the ''judgment,'' as authorized
and intended. The notice was so considered
the trial judge,
who ordered the clerk's and reporter's
prepared
and they are in the record before us. Accordingly, in the
interest of justice, the merits of defendant's appeal will be
reviewed. (People v. Hawthorne, 63 Cal.App.2d 262, 264
[146 P.2d 517]; People v. Aresen, 91 Cal.App.2d 26, 28
[204 P.2d 389, 957] ; see also Collins v. City & County
San Francisco, 112 Cal.App.2d 719, 722-723 [247 P.2d 362] .)
[5] The record reveals that at the time of revocation of
defendant's probation, a hearing was had wherein it appeared
that defendant had been found guilty of a conspiracy to
violate section 337 a of the Penal Code (committed October
24, 1952). The appeal from such judgment of conviction has
this day been decided and the judgment has been affirmed.
(People v. Robinson, Crim. No. 5580, ante, p. 132 [271 P.2d
865].) Manifestly, such conviction, though not then final
pending appeal, was sufficient to warrant the trial court's
conclusion that defendant was engaged in criminal practices
in violation of the terms of his probation, which was thereupon revoked. Under all the circumstances there is no
basis for disturbing the judgment entered against defendant.
(People v. Hainline, 219 Cal. 532, 534 [28 P.2d 16] ; People
v. S,ilverman, 33 Cal.App,2d 1, 5 [92 P.2d 507].)
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, Acting C. J., Edmonds, ,J., Traynor, ,J., and Bray,
,J. pro tern.,* concurred.
CAUTER, J.-I dissent.
Assuming that defendant bas a valid appeal from the order
revoking probation, I would reverse the order as I do not
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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[43 C.2d 147; 272 P.2d lll

a valid order
probation can be predicated
upon a
of convic:tion which has not become final.
If such a procedure is permitt(•(l. a defendant who has been
admitted to probation could have his probation revoked upon
the
of a judgment
nst him in another criminal
even though tlw latter
be void
to collateral attack It may be true that the
eourt could have based its order
probation upon
the evidence
at the trial in which the judgment
of conviction was obtained, but that is quite a different matter
than
the order revoking probation upon the judgment
of cmwiction which has not become finaL For the foregoing
reason I would reverse the order revoking probation and
the
which was pronounced against defendant folof the order revoking probation.

J., concurred.

[L. A. No. 22715.

In Bank.

,June 29, 1954.]

ANN SMITH BHADNER as Executrix.
Appellant, v.
I,EANDHO ,T. V ASQlJBZ ct aL H.espondents.
[1] Attorneys-Dealing With Client-Presumption of Invalidity.Civ. Code, § 2235, deelaring that transactions between trustee
and beneficiary by which trustee obtains advantage from beneficiary are presumed to be without consideration and under
undue influence, applies to contractual dealings between attorney and client because such relationship is one of a strict
fiduciary and confidential nature.
[2] Trusts-Transactions Between Persons in Trust RelationsPresumptions.-To bring into operation presumptions of insufficient consideration and of undue influence created by Civ.
Code, § 2235, with respect to transactions between trustee and
beneficiary, it is necessary to show that a confidential relationship existed and that this relationship was used by fiduciary
to gain an advantage, but such advantage need not be an unfair one.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, §§ 137, 142 et seq.; Am.
Jur., Attorneys at Law, § 48 et seq.
[2) See Cal.Jur., Trusts, § 5; Am.Jur., Trusts, § 605.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Attorneys, § 35; [2] Trusts, § 16;
[3, 4] Attorneys, § 39.

